Frictions in the CEO Labor Market: The Role of Talent Agents in CEO Compensation by Rajgopal, Shivaram et al.
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Accounting Papers Wharton Faculty Research
3-2012
Frictions in the CEO Labor Market: The Role of
Talent Agents in CEO Compensation
Shivaram Rajgopal
Daniel J. Taylor
University of Pennsylvania
Mohan Venkatachalam
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/accounting_papers
Part of the Accounting Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/accounting_papers/5
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rajgopal, S., Taylor, D. J., & Venkatachalam, M. (2012). Frictions in the CEO Labor Market: The Role of Talent Agents in CEO
Compensation. Contemporary Accounting Research, 29 (1), 119-151. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.2011.01082.x
Frictions in the CEO Labor Market: The Role of Talent Agents in CEO
Compensation
Disciplines
Accounting
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/accounting_papers/5
 
 
 
Frictions in the CEO Labor Market: 
The Role of Talent Agents in CEO Compensation 
 
Shiva Rajgopal* 
University of Washington Business School 
 
Daniel Taylor 
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University 
 
Mohan Venkatachalam 
Fuqua School of Business, Duke University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 2010 
 
Abstract: 
     
Standard principal-agent models commonly invoked to explain executive pay practices do not account for 
the involvement of third-party intermediaries in the CEO labor market.  This paper investigates the 
influence of one such intermediary – talent agents who seek out prospective employers and negotiate pay 
packages on behalf of CEOs.  Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) characterize the hiring of such agents as 
an obvious example of rent extraction by incoming CEOs.  After controlling for economic factors, proxies 
for governance quality, and determinants of the CEO’s reservation wage, the first year compensation of 
CEOs who use these agents is significantly higher by about $10 million relative to the pay of CEOs who 
do not use such agents.  Further analysis suggests that firms run by CEOs who use talent agents report 
superior future operating and stock performance, suggesting that these CEOs are not extracting rents at 
the expense of shareholders.  
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The Role of Talent Agents in CEO Compensation 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
The standard principal-agent paradigm is often invoked in finance and accounting research to 
understand the CEO labor market.  In this paradigm, the board of directors is assumed to negotiate at arms 
length with the CEO, and the optimal contract ties CEO compensation to shareholder wealth.  However, 
the presence of third-party intermediaries such as executive search firms, compensation consultants, and 
talent agents who represent CEOs suggests the existence of significant labor market frictions that do not 
appear in standard principal-agent models.1  
While much of the managerial accounting literature explores the relation between pay and 
performance (e.g., Lambert and Larker, 1987) only recently has the literature begun to explore the role of 
individual actors and intermediaries in the CEO selection and pay setting process.  In a field study, 
Khurana (2002) investigates the role of executive search firms in hiring CEOs.  Kaplan, Klebanov and 
Sorenson (2008) document the important characteristics and abilities of candidate CEOs based on detailed 
assessments by private equity investors.  An emerging stream of literature exploits proxy disclosures for 
years 2007 and beyond to examine whether the use of compensation consultants is associated with higher 
CEO pay (e.g., Murphy and Sandino 2008; Armstrong et al. 2009a; Cadman et al. 2009).  While 
considerable research has examined how executive talent manifests itself in earnings quality (e.g., Francis 
et al., 2008), managers’ earnings forecasts (e.g., Bamber et al., 2008), and earnings management (e.g., Ge 
et al. 2009; Hanlon et al. 2009), the literature has paid limited attention to how talented executives are 
recruited and hired.  We attempt to fill this void in the literature by focusing on the role of talent agents in 
the pay setting process.  
                                                 
1 Note that in the “plain vanilla” principal-agent model, the bargaining power is with the principal who makes a 
take-it-or-leave-it offer to the candidate CEO.  In this setting multiple firms are not competing over the candidate’s 
skills and his opportunity cost is exogenously specified.  One alternative characterization of the CEO labor market is 
an auction-like setting where firms bid over scarce CEO talent.  In this setting the equilibrium strategy for firm i is 
the ‘best response’ to firm j’s best response,’ effectively endogenizing the CEO’s opportunity cost (i.e., the next 
highest bid). 
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Talent agents typically negotiate pay packages on behalf of incoming CEOs and try to secure 
alternative job opportunities for their client CEOs.  Anecdotal and empirical evidence indicates that the 
importance of such agents has risen sharply in recent years, as CEO turnover has accelerated in the last 
decade and major corporations increasingly look to hire CEOs from outside the firm (Schellhardt 1998; 
Hermalin 2005; and Murphy and Zabojnik 2004).  The financial press and academic case studies are 
replete with stories about lavish pay packages, perquisites and other contracting arrangements that talent 
agents are able to extract from the firm on behalf of the CEO (Fredman 2001; Sachdev 2003; Barro, Hall 
and Zimmerman 2004; Jensen, Murphy and Wruck 2004).  Jensen et al. (2004) characterize the use of 
such agents as one obvious example of how CEOs skim rents from their new employer.   
Several observations support this “rent extraction” perspective.  First, a talent agent is often hired 
by the candidate CEO after a company has expressed interest in hiring the executive for the position of 
CEO.  Hence, bargaining power in negotiation with the firm rests with the candidate CEO.  Second, the 
agent may use other competing firms that are interested in hiring the candidate as a bargaining device to 
extract maximum compensation.  Because the talent agent will often “shop” the candidate’s services to 
multiple firms, the presence of the agent raises the opportunity cost of taking any one position, effectively 
endogenizing the executive’s reservation wage.  Third, some articles in the business press speculate that 
these agents charge a fixed percentage of the negotiated compensation package, making them even more 
like their counterparts in the sports and entertainment fields, who typically command anywhere from 7 to 
20 percent of their clients' salaries (National Law Journal 1997, Chief Executive 2001).  Tying the agent’s 
compensation to that of the CEO provides incentives for the agent to negotiate generous pay packages. 
Finally, Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that the hiring of prestigious sought-after CEOs is often 
associated with inferior future operating and stock performance. 
In contrast to the claims of rent extraction, it is plausible that the pay packages negotiated by the 
talent agent are consistent with a premium for CEO talent, i.e., efficient contracting.  That is, it is possible 
that CEOs who use talent agents to negotiate their compensation packages, are in fact more talented than 
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their peers (i.e. the use of a talent agent signals skill).  The fact that 81% of the CEOs represented by 
talent agents (in our dataset) are hired from outside the firm supports this alternative perspective.2,3   
Despite the controversial role played by talent agents in determining the terms of CEO 
employment and compensation, academic scrutiny of their involvement is surprisingly absent in the 
literature.  In this paper, we examine two related questions: (i) Is there evidence that CEOs who use talent 
agents (hereafter, Client CEOs) are able to obtain “excess” pay?, (ii) If so, does this premium reflect rent 
extraction (as argued by Jensen et al., 2004) or compensation for the CEO’s talent (or a signal of CEO’s 
skills)? 4 
To examine differences in compensation we benchmark the treatment sample (Client CEOs) with 
two different control samples: (i) a broad control sample of CEOs who do not use agents and, (ii) a 
propensity score matched control sample.  Our results indicate that first year pay, composed of salary, 
bonus, and other equity grants, of CEOs who used a talent agent is higher by about $10 million after 
controlling for economic, governance, and reservation wage determinants.  However, significant 
differences in pay are constrained to the first year.  To further investigate whether such “excess” 
compensation is indeed rent extraction or a manifestation of a higher level of equity incentives granted to 
increase the firm’s stock price, we examine variation in sensitivity of the CEO’s equity portfolio to a 1% 
change in stock price (portfolio delta).  We find that CEOs who use a talent agent have significantly 
                                                 
2 Since at most one of the firms interested in hiring the CEO can be the current employer, the observation that most 
CEOs represented by talent agents are hired from outside the firm is consistent with talent agents lining up multiple 
firms interested in hiring the candidate CEO.  
3 Approximately 40% of CEOs in our sample who used talent agents have employment contracts that contain an 
explicit make-whole arrangement whereby the new employer must reimburse the CEO for stock-options or other 
perquisites forfeited on departure from the prior employer. 
4 We consider rent extraction to consist of (i) “excess” compensation or an unexplained decrease in performance 
sensitive pay relative to a control sample after controlling for the standard set of economic, governance, and 
reservation wage determinants; and (ii) absence of superior future performance in the firm run by the new CEO.  We 
also define a nuanced version of rent extraction labeled “economically significant rent extraction” as a state jointly 
characterized by both rent extraction and the destruction of shareholder wealth.  Most studies (exceptions include 
Core et al. 1999) use excess compensation as a measure of rent extraction.  We take a broader perspective that any 
model that determines excess compensation can never completely control for economic determinants of differences 
in compensation contracts.  That is the reason we impose an additional necessary condition, i.e., lack of future 
performance, to demonstrate rent extraction. By excess compensation, we mean compensation in excess of the 
standard (economic and governance) determinants of pay, but not in excess of the CEO’s talent. 
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higher portfolio deltas relative to both control samples, inconsistent with the rent extraction view and 
consistent with differences in pay resulting from superior performance on the part of client CEOs. 
We conduct two additional tests to examine whether the observed “excess” compensation 
represents economically significant rent extraction or compensation for talent.  First, we examine whether 
firms that hire Client CEOs report inferior or superior future performance.  We find that firms which hire 
Client CEOs outperform their control counterparts in two respects: (i) superior operating performance 
over the following three years; and (ii) positive abnormal stock returns over the following twelve months.  
Second, we examine whether the market perceives Client CEOs as being associated with inferior or 
superior future performance.  Specifically, we consider the five day stock price reactions surrounding the 
appointment of Client CEOs.  We find that abnormal returns are positive and both statistically and 
economically significant.  Further, the returns are significantly greater than that obtained for their control 
counterparts.  This evidence is consistent with investors revising their expectation about future firm 
performance upward for Client CEOs, both in an absolute and a relative sense.  Collectively, our evidence 
is inconsistent with the assertions that Client CEOs extract rents from the firm.  Rather, it is consistent 
with observed “excess” compensation representing a premium for CEO talent, and is consistent with the 
hypothesis that highly skilled CEOs retain talent agents to signal their ability. 
Our paper contributes to the extant literature in several ways.  Our paper is among the first to 
provide empirical evidence on the role played by third-party intermediaries in the CEO pay setting 
process.  In addition, our paper contributes to the ongoing debate on whether CEO compensation 
practices, and specifically the presence of third-party intermediaries, is characterized by efficient 
contracting or rent extraction (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried 2004; Jensen et al. 2004; Conyon et al. 2006; 
Murphy and Sandino 2008; Armstrong et al. 2009a; Cadman et al. 2009).  It may not be surprising that 
incoming CEOs represented by talent agents generally fare better in terms of compensation.  However, 
the surprising finding to us is that, contrary to claims of rent extraction, we document that such CEOs are 
associated with superior future operating and stock performance. This is in contrast to Malmendier and 
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Tate (2008) who find that prestigious sought-after CEO’s are associated with inferior future operating and 
stock performance. 
Additionally, our findings that the cross-sectional variation in first-year pay is largely influenced 
by the CEO’s reservation wage (as opposed to economic determinants) and that the properties of first-
year pay are significantly different from ongoing pay have important implications for future research.  
First, our evidence suggests that proxies for the CEO’s reservation wage are empirically important 
determinants of executive pay that are currently overlooked in the empirical literature.  Second, because 
reservation wage determinants appear most important in explaining first-year pay, future research may 
want to consider first-year pay and ongoing pay separately rather than treating them as homogeneous. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the role of talent agents 
in general, and describes the hypotheses tested in the paper.  Section 3 introduces the talent agents 
examined in the study, discusses the research methods and control samples, and presents data on the 
sample.  Section 4 documents the excess compensation and differences in performance sensitive pay 
associated with the use of talent agents.  Section 5 discusses tests designed to assess the future 
performance of firms who hire a CEO represented by a talent agent.  Section 6 presents some concluding 
remarks.  
 
2.0 Institutional Background and Hypotheses  
 
2.1 Role of the talent agent  
Third-parties have perhaps always been involved in negotiating terms of CEO employment 
agreements.  The use of legal counsel to help design and verify employment contracts is perhaps not a 
recent phenomenon.  However, the services provided by talent agents are quite different from what is 
typically considered legal counsel.  Traditional lawyers tend to focus on the legality and enforceability of 
an employment contract whereas talent agents are directly involved in the CEO placement process and 
negotiation of the financial terms of the contract.  Talent agents not only negotiate the terms of the CEO’s 
contract, but they also secure alternative opportunities in order to create competition for executive talent 
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and gain a bargaining advantage.  As such, talent agents are similar to corporate headhunters or executive 
search firms, except that they work for the CEO and search for potential employers, not employees.5 
A review of the literature (both academic and the legal/business press) suggests that the advent of 
talent agents in the CEO labor market can be traced to four trends.  First, the increased mergers and 
acquisition (M&A) activity during the 1970s fueled demand for outside CEO succession and in turn, 
representation for external CEOs (Duch 1997).  Much of the early literature assumes that CEOs are hired 
from the firm’s internal labor market although recent empirical work suggests that (i) the frequency of 
forced turnover and outside succession has increased in the mid 1990s relative to the early 1970s (Huson, 
Parrino and Starks 2001); and (ii) at least one-third of all CEO successions in large publicly held firms are 
outsider successions (Khurana 2002).  This trend creates a demand for corporate headhunters, who in 
turn, often recommend that the incoming CEO hire an agent for representation (Whitford 1998).  Second, 
Hermalin (2005) reports that CEO tenure in the United States has fallen over time.  Hence, CEO 
candidates may be reluctant to leave a position of relative security without a commensurate reward or a 
guarantee of protection if things don't work out with the new employer.  Talent agents are arguably in a 
better position to negotiate such protection from the prospective employers and line up alternative 
employers.  Third, the bullish stock market of recent years has had a direct influence on the size of the 
executive pay packages.  This, in turn, increased the stakes causing a demand shock for talent agents 
(Duch 1997).  Fourth, another contributing factor to the use of talent agents is the rise of the CEO to 
prominence in the media and a desire/need to manage this public image (Hayward et al., 2004; Chatterjee 
and Hambrick, 2006; Malmendier and Tate 2008).  
                                                 
5 To the extent that these individuals provide services similar to traditional lawyers, we would expect to see similar 
compensation and firm outcomes after controlling for observables.  Since we present empirical evidence that CEOs 
represented by these agents are able to extract higher compensation later in the paper, we view our findings as 
evidence that services provided by these agents differs from what is often associated with traditional lawyers.  For 
our analyses, we take the distinct role of talent agents as given and proceed to investigate whether their involvement 
is associated with rent extraction. 
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2.2 Rent extraction hypothesis 
Whether executive labor markets are characterized by rent extraction or efficient contracting is an 
ongoing debate in the literature.  Several prior studies interpret their findings as evidence of rent 
extraction in the CEO labor market.  Both Core et al. (1999) and Faleye (2007) find an overall negative 
association between governance and “excess” pay, and document that such pay is associated with value 
destruction vis-a-vis poor future performance.  Additionally, several recent studies argue that the 
involvement of third-parties in the pay setting process is associated with rent extraction.  In particular, 
recent work by Conyon et al. (2006), Murphy and Sandino (2008), and Armstrong et al. (2009a) suggests 
that the increased pay levels associated with the use of compensation consultants is consistent with rent 
extraction.  If compensation consultants who work on behalf of the Board are associated with rent 
extraction, then it is reasonable to believe that talent agents, whose interests are better aligned with the 
CEO’s, are also associated with rent extraction. 
Proponents of the rent extraction hypothesis (e.g., Jensen et al. 2004) argue that talent agents 
serve as a conduit for rent extraction by CEOs.  They assert that the presence of the talent agent can 
provide CEOs with increased bargaining power that they can then exercise to extract favorable terms.  For 
example, Jensen et al. (2004) report that at most times the incoming CEO negotiates not with the 
compensation committee, but with the general counsel of the firm or an executive such as the VP of 
Human Resources who will end up reporting to the CEO.  Consequently, these executives have obvious 
incentives to please their new boss by being generous with the financial arrangements in the negotiation 
process.  Jensen et al. (2004) quote the following passage to illustrate the negotiation process: 
Mr. Bachelder takes private delight in spotting the other side's weaknesses during 
negotiations. "Joe took me aside after one contract," says Michael Valentino, an 
executive who has worked at several drug companies, and told me: 'I knew on Day One 
that we were going to get you everything you wanted.'  When Mr. Valentino asked 
why, Mr. Bachelder told him that the hiring company had mistakenly put its general 
counsel in charge of the talks. "When this is over, you're going to be that guy's boss," 
Mr. Bachelder explained.  "He knows that. He can't fight you too hard on anything.”  
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Moreover, Jensen et al. (2004) claim that the courting firm, not the incoming CEO, pays the agent’s fees.6  
Such a lop-sided negotiation process can be viewed as an agency problem where the incoming CEO has 
so much more bargaining power, vis-à-vis the directors of the company.   
Fredman (2001) reports that the talent agent’s specialized knowledge of CEO pay trends, 
contractual terms, and which firms are interested in hiring CEOs, is especially important because most 
negotiations between the candidate and the courting company are conducted at top speed.  Hence, there is 
little time for the courting employer to thoroughly research comparable compensation packages and the 
candidate CEO’s opportunity cost.  Furthermore, it is alleged that talent agents are at a tactical advantage 
because by the time they get involved in negotiations, the board has decided on the candidate CEO and it 
is up to the agent to close the deal.   
One may wonder how an executive (and his talent agent) who is not yet employed by the firm can 
co-opt the board and the governance process even before being hired.  Proponents of the rent extraction 
hypothesis believe that co-opting can occur even with newly minted CEOs due to the potential bargaining 
power that the incoming CEO enjoys.  Anders (2003) reports that CEO talent agents often arrive at a 
point of vulnerability for a corporation, when its board is hoping for a seamless change in leadership to 
steady the firm and chart a new course.  The pressure from analysts, prominent institutional investors and 
even the media, to find and retain a CEO, especially for firms replacing a poorly performing CEO, can be 
quite high.  This, in turn may result in “co-option” by the board to yield to the demands of a celebrity 
incoming CEO (as is the case with most of our sample) even though they may not have had sufficient 
history with the board of their new employer.  It is plausible that the negotiation process is the beginning 
of what could be a broader failure in the governance process.  In sum, the outcome of such a negotiation 
process can be an over-generous pay package and contractual terms of employment for the candidate 
CEO.  Thus, our hypothesis is: 
                                                 
6 Approximately 56% of CEOs in our sample who used talent agents have employment contracts that contain an 
explicit clause to this effect. 
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H1: The involvement of talent agents in the pay setting process is associated with rent extraction 
on the part of the CEO.  
2.3 Efficient contracting 
As with all rent extraction claims, the arguments underlying H1 are largely a-theoretic as they 
rely more on anecdotes rather than on solid theory.7  The alternative hypothesis to H1 is that either talent 
agents represent (i) an important information intermediary in the pay-setting process; and/or (ii) CEOs 
retain talent agents to signal their abilities.  We hypothesize that the talent agent has superior knowledge, 
relative to the CEO, about the hiring firm.  The “plain vanilla” principal agent model neglects the 
possibility of frictions in the CEO labor market such as the existence of non-trivial search costs for 
employees.  Ex ante, talent agents play a role because their very existence suggests the existence of labor 
market frictions.  If there were no market frictions, individuals would know who was hiring, know what 
the prospective employer was looking for, know their reservation wage and be able to negotiate with the 
employer and have no need for a talent agent or other representation.  The talent agent is the one who 
does the job hunting for the CEO.  The agent’s job is to find out who is hiring, what they are looking 
forward, relay this to the CEO, and promote the CEO at the potential employer.  Furthermore, CEOs may 
use talent agents to signal their (the CEOs) “high type.”  If talent agents can credibly commit to working 
only with CEOs of high type, the high type CEOs will want to work with the agent in order to signal their 
talent to future employers, the talent agent need not contribution anything other than his seal of approval. 
Talent agents can play a signaling role not unlike education in the Spence-model.  If a talent agent 
has a reputation for working only with the CEOs of the highest ability, then high ability CEOs will want 
to work with this agent in order to credibly signal they are of high ability.  The talent agent need not offer 
any service other than to stamp his seal of approval.  These arguments suggest that the talent agent’s 
involvement in the pay setting process need not necessarily be associated with rent extraction.  In 
                                                 
7 H1 could be criticized on the grounds that it lacks theoretical justification.  However, we take the approach of 
observing current practice in the executive labor market and ask what rational explanations have been offered in 
academe and the popular press to explain this practice. We then proceed to explore whether the practice is consistent 
with a rational explanation, and test the implications of this explanation.   
 10
particular, differences in CEO pay between incoming CEOs with and without the involvement of a talent 
agent might merely reflect economic differences between firms and/or differences in CEO skill.  Thus, 
the efficient contracting view posits that any differential compensation paid to CEOs that used a talent 
agent is explainable by economic determinants or superior talent.  Thus, the efficient contracting view 
suggests:  
HIA: The involvement of talent agents in the pay setting process is not associated with rent 
extraction.  After controlling for economic determinants, differences in CEO pay between CEOs 
with and without talent agents represent premiums for the incoming CEO’s talent. 
 
3.0 Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
 
3.1 The agents 
  
To conduct our empirical analysis we first need to obtain a list of talent agents.  We identified 
Joseph Bachelder and Robert Stucker as our initial set of agents.  Several articles in the business press 
(e.g., Schellhardt 1998; Sachdev 2003) cite these two lawyers as leading agents.  Besides these lawyers, 
we identified six others cited in an article in the National Law Journal (1997): David Anderson, Henry 
Blackiston, Lawrence Cagney, Linda Rappaport, Thomas Roberts and Jonathan Zorn.  However, an 
extensive search of the SEC’s EDGAR database, the employment contracts on The Corporate Library’s 
database, LexisNexis, and Google resulted in seven usable sample observations for Lawrence Cagney but 
none for the other five.8  Hence, we restrict our attention to Bachelder, Stucker and Cagney.   
Joseph E. Bachelder is an attorney based in New York City who has made his career negotiating 
employment contracts between large corporations and their senior executive management.  He represents 
clients in matters related to both initial employment and severance.  On his firm’s website, 
www.jebachelder.com, Bachelder indicates that he has represented executives in matters involving 
several prominent companies such as AT&T, Bank of America, Campbell Soup Company, Gillette, IBM, 
Morgan Stanley, Philip Morris, Sunbeam, and others.  Bachelder has represented executives in contract 
                                                 
8 Details on sample formation appear in Section 3.2 and Table 1. 
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negotiations since 1980 and is reputed to be a hard-nosed negotiator (Anders 2003).  He is also known to 
employ highly sophisticated methods to secure the most favorable terms for his clients.  For example, he 
employs a mathematician who helps calculate the value of executive benefits such as forfeited pensions 
and option grants from the CEO’s previous employer (Anders 2003).  Such calculations enable Bachelder 
to ask the candidate CEO’s new employer to “make whole” these forfeited benefits.  Bachelder is also a 
public advocate of the high compensation levels currently paid to senior executives.  While testifying 
before Congress in 2003, Bachelder rallied to chief executives' defense, portraying them as "fiduciaries of 
enormous masses of capital whose pay is set equitably in a free market.”   
Robert J. Stucker, often portrayed as Bachelder’s leading competitor, is the chairman of the law 
firm Vedder Price Kaufman & Kammholz and is nationally recognized as a tough negotiator in the 
recruitment and employment arrangements for CEOs.  His resume posted on the law firm’s website 
(www.vedderprice.com) lists assignments in the area of new CEO compensation and employment 
arrangements at companies such as Albertson’s, Cable & Wireless, Campbell’s Soup, Delta Air Lines, 
Electronic Data Systems, Hershey Foods, Home Depot, Honeywell International, J.C. Penney, Levi 
Strauss, Mattel, 3M, Pharmacia, Quaker Oats, R.R. Donnelley, Tyco, The Gap, and SPX Corporation. 
Lawrence Cagney is a partner at Debevoise and Plimpton LLC (www.debevoise.com) and chairs 
the firm’s Executive Compensation and Employee Benefits Group.  His clients include executives placed 
at Disney, American Airlines, Chrysler, Hilton Hotels, and Starwood Hotels.  Both Chambers USA (2005) 
and The Best Lawyers In America (2005- 2006, 2007) rank Cagney as a leader in employee benefits and 
executive compensation law. 
We do not claim that the three talent agents we consider in this analysis are the only talent agents 
used by CEOs.  Our intention is to focus on the most prominent talent agents employed by CEOs.  We 
acknowledge that our sample of talent agents is small because the media coverage of less popularized 
agents, on which we rely to pick our sample of talent agents, is likely spotty or absent.  Moreover, client-
lawyer confidential agreements preclude obtaining an exhaustive list of talent agents and the CEOs who 
employ them. 
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3.2 Treatment sample 
Our treatment sample is comprised of incoming CEOs who have retained a talent agent to 
negotiate their employment contract.9  As mentioned before, our ability to identify these CEOs is limited, 
as client identity is covered by attorney-client confidentiality.  To obtain our treatment sample we search 
the SEC's EDGAR database, the Corporate Library’s database of employment agreements, LexisNexis, 
and Google for various permutations of the agent’s name.  This search results in several popular press 
articles that reveal details on certain talent agent clients, and actual employment agreements where the 
agent is mentioned as having represented the CEO.  From here we are able to compile a list of executive-
firm combinations that compose our client list (treatment sample). Panel A Table 1 reveals that of the 36 
treatment firms identified, 13 were identified in employment agreements on file with the Corporate 
Library, 11 from SEC EDGAR filings, and 12 from LexisNexis and Google press articles.  For a CEO to 
be part of our sample we require any two of three items: year of agreement, firm name, or executive 
name.  This search process results in a list of 124 unique firms, which used one of the agents in at least 
one transaction (including those not involving executive compensation). Of these, we are able to identify 
CEO compensation agreements and the respective executives in 48 firms.10  We eliminate 14 firms 
because of data- availability constraints highlighted in panel A of Table 1.  Panel B of Table 1 lists the 
names of the CEOs (along with the hiring firm) considered in our empirical analyses.  Note that the 
courting firms are very prominent firms, as evidenced by the fact that the market capitalization of these 
                                                 
9 Talent agents are also known to have negotiated termination agreements for CEOs when they leave their former 
employer (Fredman 2001).  Note that these deals are different from severance agreements negotiated ex ante before 
the CEO joins the firm.  A search for such ex post termination agreements yielded 14 observations.  Apart from one 
case (Dick Grasso for NYSE), the other 13 represent CEO terminations at public firms.  We did not investigate ex 
post terminations, but focused instead on talent agent involvement in incoming CEO negotiations for two reasons.  
First, termination payments are not captured by the EXECUCOMP database.  While hand collecting such data for 
the treatment sample (talent agent clients) should be trivial, hand gathering termination data for a credible control 
sample of CEO terminations not negotiated by talent agent is likely to be a time-consuming and expensive venture 
(see Yermack 2006 for a discussion on severance packages).  Second, even if we do find excess severance benefits 
for talent agent clients it would be very difficult to test whether such excess is consistent with value destruction.  
This is because any future firm performance that we examine subsequent to severance would be contaminated by the 
performance attributable to the incoming CEO. 
10 Our client identification procedure is designed to minimize instances where executives are falsely classified as 
having used a talent agent (i.e. we require explicit documentation either in a popular press article or in an 
employment contract). So we can rule out having misclassified executives as having used an agent when in fact they 
did not. 
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firms in the year prior to hiring the incoming CEO constitutes 15.45% of the market capitalizations of 
Dow Jones industrial index and approximately 5% of the total market capitalization of the S&P 500. 
Two potential concerns about sample selection bias deserve discussion. One, the talent agent may 
reveal his involvement to the press only in cases where the sample outcome was good for the agent, 
resulting in higher pay for the CEO, and hence tilting the sample toward rent extraction hypothesis (e.g., 
Jensen et al., 2004).  However, it seems unlikely that a CEO or the firm would want to willingly provide 
information about potential rent extraction to outside stakeholders.  A second concern is that the sample is 
potentially tilted in favor of the efficient contracting hypothesis in that firms potentially disclose the 
involvement of a talent agent when the incoming CEO is associated with superior future stock returns and 
operating performance (e.g., Laksmana 2008). However, because the disclosure of an agent is provided in 
the employment agreement, and is usually made at the time of hiring, this argument presumes (i) that the 
firm has ex ante knowledge about future returns and operating performance under the new CEO, and (ii) 
that this knowledge is not impounded in price at the time of the disclosure (see Section 5.2).  Thus, we do 
not believe that the sample is biased towards either finding rent extraction or efficient contracting.  
3.3 Control samples 
We investigate whether talent agents are associated with rent extraction using two approaches: (i) 
a traditional regression approach with an unmatched control sample and, (ii) a matched sample approach 
with a propensity score matched control sample.  We use both methods to ensure robustness of our 
findings.  Below we discuss the two approaches and construction of the two control samples. 
3.3.1 Regression Approach - Unmatched Control Sample 
We begin by examining how a non-randomly distributed treatment (the use of a talent agent) 
affects executive and firm outcomes.  A common research design for investigating the effects of a 
treatment (or event) on outcome variables is to regress observed outcomes for all observations on an 
indicator variable for whether the observation received the treatment (Talent Agent) and to control for 
confounding effects by including such variables in the regression.   
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 The unmatched sample used in our regression analysis includes all CEOs on Execucomp 
excluding co-CEOs, with non-missing CEO appointment date, total compensation, total cash 
compensation, salary, restricted stock grants, and data on options values.  Additionally, we require 
financial statement variables that we obtain from Compustat and governance variables obtained from 
Execucomp.  Finally, we require that our sample contains data for the executive’s first year as CEO of the 
firm.11  The resulting unmatched control sample contains 1,761 executives.12  To be clear, our unmatched 
sample consists of every firm that has a new incoming CEO on Execucomp and not identified as having 
used a talent agent.  If we incorrectly classify executives as not having used a talent agent when in fact 
they did, this would bias toward finding similar results for both treatment and control groups. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the treatment and unmatched control samples.  We 
examine differences between the two samples on various dimensions such as firm characteristics, 
governance variables, reservation wage variables and compensation.  Across all dimensions, we observe 
differences between the treatment and the control samples. First, treatment firms are larger in size and are 
less likely to separate the position of CEO and Chairman.  Second, the treatment sample contains a larger 
fraction of CEOs who were hired from outside the firm (Outsider), who held the position of CEO at their 
previous employer (CEO of Prior Employer), and who worked in the same industry in their previous 
                                                 
11 This is done to ensure comparability between results of tests on first-year pay and ongoing pay. In instances 
where firms in the treatment sample firms are missing data items in Compustat or Execucomp we hand collect it 
from the respective financial statements.  A potential concern about compensation relates to partial-year 
employment.  That is, a new CEO hiring a talent agent may have worked for a firm for three months in their first 
tenure year while another firm may employ the new CEO for nine months of the first tenure year. In un-tabulated 
results we find that the average months worked during the first year is the same between talent agent clients and 
non-talent agent clients.  In addition, we annualized the cash compensation paid to the CEO in the first year to 
compensate for cross-sectional differences in the number of months worked in the first year and find similar results. 
12 To analyze future operating and stock performance following the hiring of the CEO, we impose additional sample 
constraints.  In our analysis of future operating performance, we require ROA in the year after the CEO was hired, 
and in our analysis of future stock returns (event returns) we require coverage on CRSP over a 48-month (11-day) 
window centered on the date the executive became CEO. Thus, the analysis of future operating performance, stock 
performance, and event returns is based on samples of 1666, 1797, and 1794 observations respectively.  We do not 
impose these sample requirements when analyzing contemporaneous executive compensation, as requiring future 
returns or operating performance would unnecessarily induce look-ahead or delisting bias.    
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position (Industry Knowledge).13  Finally, we find that the unconditional average first-year pay of CEOs 
in the treatment sample is approximately $14 million more than the control sample.  Given these 
differences it is imperative that the relevant variables be included in the regression equation to control for 
confounding effects.  
Despite controlling for the confounding effects, a natural concern with unmatched regression-
based approaches is the effect of omitted variables on the coefficient of interest, in this case the 
coefficient on Talent Agent.  In order to call into question our collective evidence that the use of a talent 
agent is a proxy for unobserved talent, an omitted variable, unrelated to talent, would need to be not only 
positively related to compensation and equity incentives, but also to future operating performance, future 
stock performance, and event returns surrounding the appointment of the CEO, and incremental to 
existing control variables.  While we view it as unlikely that omitted variable(s) would explain the 
collective results of our compensation, equity incentive, future operating performance, future stock 
performance, and event return tests, we can not rule out such a scenario.   
3.3.2 Matched Sample Approach – Propensity Score Matched Control Sample 
An inherent limitation with a traditional regression approach using an unmatched control sample 
is that such regressions assume a precise functional form of the outcome variable (e.g., compensation, 
operating performance, returns).  In other words, the regression approach assumes that outcomes (Y) are 
linear in observable predictors (X).  If instead outcomes are a non-linear function of X or a linear function 
of non-linear transformations of X (e.g. squared-term, interaction term, log transform), then simply 
regressing Y on X will not control for cross-sectional variation in observables between treatment and 
control samples.  To see this, suppose there are two firms, firm 1 (2) is in the treatment (control) sample, 
and 
Yi =  αi + f(Xi)  i= 1,2      (3) 
                                                 
13 Given the preponderance of external hires in the treatment sample, our matched sample in Table 1B is composed 
only of external hires. 
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where Xi is the vector of observables for firm i and f(.) is a non-linear function that maps observables to 
outcomes.  Then the difference between Y1 and Y2 is not linear in the observables, such that a simple 
regression of outcomes on predictors will not adequately control for cross-sectional differences in 
observables across the two samples.  To see this note that 
Y1 – Y2   =  α1 – α2 + f(X1) - f(X2)        (4) 
 ≠  α1 – α2 + β(X1 – X2) 
Because in general X1 ≠ X2, and we are not willing to assume a particular function form for the outcome, 
the latter f(.) terms will not cancel and, absent additional assumptions, we are left without an estimable 
function.   
An alternative research design is to use a matched sample.  In contrast to the regression-based 
approach, matching does not require the researcher to specify the functional form of the outcome being 
estimated, such that matching on observable predictors is robust to alternative (non-linear) functional 
forms of the outcome variable.  The main difference between regression and matching approaches is how 
they incorporate confounding variables into the analysis.  In a matched pair design, each observation that 
received the treatment effect is paired with an observation that did not receive the treatment but is similar 
along all other relevant dimensions. Since the matched control sample is similar in every observable 
dimension, any difference in outcome between treatment and control samples can be attributed to the 
treatment effect.  Using the above framework, if we select firm 1 and firm 2 such that X1 and X2 are 
similar, f(X1) - f(X2) goes to zero and we are left with: 
  Y1 – Y2  = α1 – α2 + f(X1) - f(X2) = α1 – α2      (5) 
Such that if firms are adequately matched along the relevant dimensions (X), then to assess the treatment 
effect we need only compare the difference in outcomes across the two samples and no additional 
regression is necessary.  This discussion suggests that an important step when using matching methods is 
to ensure covariate balance between the two samples, namely that both the treatment and control samples 
appear similar along all the relevant dimensions.   
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Because of the many confounding covariates, we adopt the propensity score method for matching 
on multiple covariates (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Armstrong et al. 2009b). The propensity score 
method is a simple way of matching on multiple dimensions simultaneously.  In this approach, we 
determine a propensity score which is the conditional probability of receiving the treatment effect (i.e., 
the probability that the CEO used a talent agent) given all the observable confounding variables.   
The propensity score method requires an estimate of the conditional probability of using a talent 
agent given observable economic, governance, and reservation wage determinants.  We estimate a probit 
model that relates the probability of using a talent agent with various proxies of observable firm and CEO 
characteristics.  We describe the various proxies below: 
(i) Economic determinants:  Based on prior empirical and theoretical research we include 
proxies for size - Log(Sales), firm performance - ROA (return on assets) and RET (fiscal year 
buy-and-hold return), risk - Std Dev of ROA (Std Dev of RET), the standard deviation of ROA 
(RET) over the prior five fiscal years, investment opportunities - Investment Opp, the average 
fiscal year-end market-to-book ratio for the prior five years, and firm distress - Altman-Z.   
(ii) Governance determinants:  We include the following proxies for the firm’s governance 
structure: (a) the extent of institutional ownership (Institutional Holdings); (b) whether the 
CEO is also the chair of the board (IsChair); (c); whether the CEO is interlocked with a 
member of the compensation committee (Interlocked);  (d) the proportion of the top 5 highly-
compensated officers of the firm that sit on the board (Top5Directors); (e) the proportion of 
the top 5 highly-compensated officers of the firm that are interlocked with the board members 
of the firm (Top5Interlocked); and (f) the fraction of the firm’s equity owned by the top 5 
highly-compensated officers of the firm (Top5Ownership).14   
                                                 
14 One could argue that the governance determinants relate more to the relationship between the outgoing CEO and 
the board.  However if there were agency problems at the firm which led to inflated compensation, prior to the 
hiring of the new CEO, these same agency problems might lead to inflated compensation being paid to the incoming 
CEO.  Note also, that this concern only applies to the analysis of “first year pay.”  The ongoing pay of the CEO will 
be determined by governance structures as they evolve after the hiring of the new CEO. For this reason, we follow 
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(iii) Reservation wage determinants:  We use several proxies for the CEO’s opportunity cost: (a) 
whether the CEO was hired from outside the firm (Outsider); (b) whether the CEO held the 
same position with his/her prior employer (CEO of Prior Employer); (c) whether the CEO 
has industry knowledge (Industry Knowledge), based on whether he came from the same 
Fama and French (1997) industry group; and (d) average total compensation for CEOs 
joining the respective Fama and French (1997) industry group that year, or Market Wage. As 
an aside, it is worth noting that the Market Wage variable implicitly controls for average 
compensation levels that are correlated with time and industry membership.  Hence, the 
specifications to follow do not include explicit year and industry dummies.15   
Panel A of Table 3 reports the results of estimating the propensity score model that incorporates the 
above variables, where the dependent variable (Talent Agent) is set to 1 if the CEO used a talent agent 
and is set to zero otherwise.  We report results in a sequential manner by including economic, 
governance and reservation wage determinants additively one at a time.  This helps illustrate the 
incremental explanatory power of each of the determinants in the probit estimation.  Notice that the 
explanatory power (Pseudo R2) increases from 5.85% to 12.70% after including the governance 
determinants.  Including the reservation wage determinants further increases the explanatory power to 
23.12%.  Thus, all three determinants are important in the decision to use a talent agent.  We restrict 
our attention to the full model (last two columns in Panel A of Table 3) that incorporates all the 
relevant firm and CEO characteristics and that has the best fit (highest χ2, highest Pseudo R2, and 
lowest AIC).  The results suggest that use of a talent agent is more likely in larger firms (z-statistic on 
Log(Sales) is 2.58), better performing firms (z-statistic on RET is 1.98), firms with low institutional 
ownership (z-statistic on Institutional Holdings is -2.70), firms that do not separate the CEO and 
                                                                                                                                                             
prior work and include governance as a determinant of compensation in our regressions, both for first-year and 
ongoing pay. 
15 Ideally, we would have included the identity of the compensation consultant or the search agent as potential 
determinants of executive compensation.  Note, however, that firms are required to disclose the identity of the 
compensation consultant only for years 2007 and beyond.  We are not aware of systematic data on the involvement 
of search firms in hiring incoming CEOs. 
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Chair positions (z-statistic on IsChair is 2.44) and firms where a smaller proportion of the top 5 
officers are interlocked (z-statistic of –3.21).  Moreover, outside CEOs (z-statistic of 3.49), former 
CEOs (z-statistic of 1.74) and CEOs with a higher market wage (z-statistic of 1.74) are more likely to 
use talent agents.   
We compute a propensity score, i.e., the predicted probability that the CEO used a talent agent, 
for each CEO, which we will use for constructing our matched pair.  Unlike standard matching algorithms 
that match on specific variables in a step-wise fashion (for example, matching on size and then market-to-
book), the propensity score procedure accommodates a large number of matching variables.  The task of 
constructing a matched sample using stepwise matching becomes increasing difficult when treatment and 
control samples differ along several dimensions.  Since we need to control for difference in economic 
factors, governance structure, and reservation wage, the propensity score methodology offers a 
parsimonious approach to obtaining a matched control sample.  In particular, the Propensity Score 
Matched Sample is composed of the 36 CEOs known to have used a talent agent and the 36 CEOs not 
identified as having used talent agent but with the highest propensity scores.   
An important step in the propensity score based matched sample is to evaluate covariate balance, 
i.e., determine the similarity in the distribution of the treatment and the propensity score matched control 
samples.  Covariate balance ensures that the treatment and matched control sample are similar across all 
dimensions except the variable of interest, i.e., the use of talent agent.  We assess covariate balance by 
testing whether the means (distributions) are different between the treatment and control samples and 
report t-statistics (Kolmogorov-Smirnov p-values) in Panel B of Table 3.  The results suggest that the 
propensity score matched control sample resembles the treatment sample along virtually all dimensions.  
At the 5% level the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the null of similar distributions in 2 of the 17 
variables (note that at the 5% level we might expect to reject at least one).  Control firms differ in the 
distribution of Altman-Z and CEO of Prior Employer. Moreover, in cases where the two samples have 
dissimilar means, the differences mainly bias in favor of higher (lower) pay for the control (treatment) 
sample.  Control sample firms are less likely to separate the position of CEO and Chair (control mean: 
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0.83, treatment mean: 0.67, t-statistic of -2.29), and the control sample contains a larger fraction of CEOs 
who were hired from outside the firm, in fact it is composed entirely of outside CEOs (control mean: 
1.00, treatment mean 0.81 ,t-statistic of  -2.80), and a larger fraction of CEOs who held the same position 
at their previous employer (control mean: 0.72, treatment mean: 0.33, t-statistic of  -3.17).   On balance, 
we believe that we have a reasonable control sample that has reasonable covariate balance with the 
treatment sample.   
 
4.0 Compensation Analyses 
 In this section, we examine both the entry (first-year) as well as subsequent pay packages of 
CEOs represented by talent agents relative to the unmatched control sample and the propensity score 
matched control sample.   
4.1 Do CEOs that use talent agents get more compensation than their counterparts?  
Initially, we consider first year compensation for CEOs. We do so because the dynamic nature of 
compensation contracts will make the compensation arrangements different across time.  Surprisingly, 
most prior research simply pools first year compensation with subsequent compensation (e.g., Jensen and 
Murphy (1990), Sloan (1993), Hall and Murphy (2002), Engel et al. (2002), Roulstone (2003), Cheng 
(2004), Comprix and Muller (2006), and Core Guay Larcker (2008)).   Column (1) of Table 4, Panel A 
presents the results of a regression of total CEO compensation for the treatment sample and the 
unmatched control sample on several firm-specific variables that are known to capture the economic 
determinants associated with pay.  In particular, we use the following variables that are hypothesized by 
past research (Core et al. 1999) to determine compensation levels: size (Log(Sales)), investment 
opportunity set (Investment Opp), operating performance (ROA), stock performance (RET), and firm 
volatility proxied by standard deviation of ROA and stock returns (Std Dev of ROA, Std Dev of RET).  
Columns (2) and (3) estimate a similar regression using the governance proxies and proxies for 
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reservation wage motivated in the previous section.16  Because pay is both cross-sectionally and serially 
correlated, t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by firm and year (Gow et al., 2009; Petersen, 
2009). 
Consistent with prior work, column (1) shows that larger firms, firms with more volatile 
operating performance, and healthier firms pay their CEOs more (t-statistics on Log(Sales), Std. Dev. Of 
ROA, and Altman-Z are 7.18, 2.89, and 2.17 respectively).  Note that ROA is not significant suggesting 
that the incoming CEO’s first year pay is unrelated to his employer’s ROA for the first year.  More 
interesting, after controlling for the above variables, the presence of a talent agent adds $11.6 million to a 
CEO’s first year total compensation (t-statistic = 5.53).  Thus, it appears that talent agents are able to 
extract significant excess compensation for their client CEOs. 
We next investigate whether the excess compensation attributable to talent agents is due to the 
presence of weak governance structures that CEOs exploit to extract greater compensation.  Results in 
column (2) of Table 4, Panel A are mixed.  There is some evidence to support the hypothesis that CEOs 
extract rents due to weak governance, i.e., firms with CEO as the chairman of the board and where a 
greater fraction of officers are interlocked.  However, the proxies for governance structures are 
insufficient to eliminate excess compensation attributable to talent agents.    
Turning to the proxies for reservation wage in column (3), we find that outside CEOs and CEOs 
with a higher market wage before they join the firm are paid more (t-statistics of 3.92 and 6.36 
respectively), consistent with the predictions of Harris and Helfat (1997).  Moreover, the reservation wage 
determinants have greater explanatory power than the economic determinants.  In particular, the 
reservation wage determinants explain 27.44% of the variation in compensation of incoming CEOs 
relative to 20.17% attributable to the economic determinants.  Thus, it appears as though the reservation 
wage is a key determinant of first year pay and potentially even more important than economic 
determinants and governance proxies.  In untabulated work, we have added four additional variables to 
                                                 
16 Note that the variables used to construct the propensity score matched sample are also the variables used to 
estimate expected pay by design not by accident.  Recall that our matched sample design requires us to match on all 
relevant predictors of the outcomes of interest.  
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proxy for the incoming CEO’s reservation wage in the regression of first year pay on reservation wage 
proxies without any change in the reported inferences: (a) stock return performance at the new CEO’s 
prior firm over the last three years of his tenure; and (b) incoming CEO’s total compensation for the last 
year at his previous firm to account for the pay given up at the prior employer; (c) value of unexercisable 
in-the-money options for the incoming CEO during the CEO’s last year at his previous firm; and (d) the 
celebrity status of the CEO, proxied by the number of mentions in the popular press. 
In column (4) of Table 4, Panel A we report results from the regression after including all the 
determinants of CEO compensation.  We find that most of the determinants that are significant in 
regressions reported in columns (1) through (3) are also significant in the regression reported in column 
(4) with one exception.   The only governance proxy that survives the economic determinants introduced 
in column (4) is Top5Interlocked (t-statistic = 2.17).  Thus, firms where a bigger proportion of the officers 
are interlocked appear to pay their incoming CEOs more.     
While a significant portion of the compensation of CEOs is attributable to economic 
determinants, governance structures and higher reservation wages, we still observe that $10.3 million of 
“excess” compensation attributable to talent agents remains unexplained.17  Much of the excess 
compensation stems from equity compensation rather than from cash compensation (see columns (5) and 
(6) of Table 4, Panel A).   
When we benchmark the compensation of the treatment firms with propensity-score matched 
control firms, the differences in “excess” compensation persist.  Recall that the control sample is 
empirically similar to the treatment sample along all the relevant dimensions. Panel B of Table 4 shows 
that the average (median) total compensation for treatment sample CEOs is $17.7 ($11.3) million, relative 
to $8.3 ($3.2) million for control sample CEOs. The difference in means, medians, and distributions are 
statistically significant at less than at less than the 1% level.   
                                                 
17 We also control for the capital market’s perception of CEO talent by including the 11 day market reaction 
surrounding the announcement of a new CEO as a control variable in the regressions.  While the coefficient on the 
announcement period return is significantly positive, inferences from untabulated results are qualitatively similar to 
those previously reported.   
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Table 5 reports evidence on whether the excess compensation reported for first year persists in 
subsequent years after CEO appointment.  We employ the same regressions specification as before, but 
restrict our analysis to those years subsequent to the year of appointment. In this manner, the coefficient 
on Talent Agent captures the average excess annual compensation for a CEO who used a talent agent in 
the years subsequent to appointment.  The results are mixed.  Results from the unmatched sample 
reported in panel A suggest that CEOs who hire a talent agent enjoy “excess” total compensation after the 
first year of about $2.7 million (see column 4).  This is significantly smaller than that reported for CEO’s 
first year compensation.   
However, we are unable to find any “excess” compensation associated with talent agents when 
we use the propensity matched control (see panel B of Table 5).  Aggregating the evidence, we conclude 
that the effect of talent agents on the level of CEO pay is primarily in the CEO’s first year of office. 
4.2 Equity incentives 
In this section we consider another approach to examine whether compensation contracts 
negotiated by talent agents represent rent extraction.  We investigate whether the intensity of equity 
incentives given to executives to raise the firm’s stock price is different between the treatment and control 
samples.  Our measure of incentive intensity is the quintile rank of the change in the risk-neutral value of 
the CEO’s equity portfolio for a 1% change in the price of the underlying stock.  In other words, we use 
the CEO’s Portfolio Delta as a measure of equity incentives.  We use the quintile rank of Portfolio Delta 
in our analysis to reduce measurement error associated with computing the equity portfolio delta (Core 
and Guay 2002; Armstrong et al. 2009b).  In particular, we use quintile ranks instead of the actual 
portfolio deltas because the distribution of the actual portfolio deltas is severely right skewed. 
Regression results of estimating the relation between Portfolio Delta and the economic and 
governance factors outlined in the previous section are presented in panel A of Table 6.  As before, we 
consider the equity incentives for the first year of CEO appointment as well as the equity incentives for 
years subsequent to the appointment.  Panel A reveals that executives that use a talent agent are offered 
greater equity incentives when compared to the larger control sample, regardless of whether the first-
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year’s incentives or longer period incentives are considered.  The coefficient on Talent Agent is the same, 
0.72, for both first year and subsequent years.   
When the propensity-score matched sample is considered, the average equity incentive for both 
the year of CEO appointment and subsequent years is larger for the treatment sample relative to the 
matched control sample.  Collectively, the evidence suggests that a CEO who retains a talent agent gets 
greater incentives to increase the firm’s stock price relative to the control sample.  Such higher levels of 
ongoing incentives are generally consistent with the earlier observation that several talent agent clients are 
hired to turn ailing companies around.  If CEOs use talent agents to signal skill and are truly more 
talented, then they would seek to have greater equity base pay as this allows for a greater pay-for-
performance link and maximizes the potential payoff from superior firm performance.  Hence, under the 
efficient contracting hypothesis, we would expect to observe greater equity/performance pay for CEOs 
that hire talent agents. 
 
5.0 Is the presence of talent agents associated with value destruction? 
 
The evidence thus far points to support for “excess” compensation as well as increased equity 
incentives in the year of appointment of talent agent CEO.  However, it is quite plausible that the “excess” 
compensation and equity incentives may simply be indicative of efficient contracting.  We turn next to an 
investigation of whether the presence of talent agents is associated with significant rent extraction.  The 
efficient contracting view posits that the “excess” compensation documented earlier is compensation for 
talent, such that we would expect to find that the hiring of a talent agent CEO is associated with superior 
future operating and/or stock performance.  In particular, superior future operating and/or stock 
performance would be consistent with the hypothesis that skilled CEOs retain talent agents to signal their 
skill.  In contrast, the rent extraction view posits that the “excess” compensation is not attributable to 
talent and hence, the presence of talent agent should not increase future firm performance, and at the 
extreme (in the case of value destruction) result in inferior future operating and/or stock performance.   
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To provide evidence on these two alternative explanations, we follow Core et al. (1999) to assess 
whether talent agent CEOs are associated with future operating and stock performance.  Note the 
difference between these two performance measures.  Using stock returns as a measure of future 
performance may result in lower power in discriminating between efficient contracting and rent extraction 
because a test based on stock returns is a joint test of stock market efficiency and contracting efficiency.  
For example, even if rent extraction were the true state of the world, investors in an efficient stock market 
might anticipate such rent extraction and already factor it into the existing stock price.  As a result, future 
stock returns could be unrelated to the existence of the talent agent, even if they extract rents from the 
firm on behalf of their CEO clients.  Thus, an examination of future stock returns, in isolation, cannot rule 
out rent extraction even if evidence supports otherwise.  Earnings-based performance metrics such as 
ROA suffer less from the problem of anticipating rent extraction but have problems of their own.  In 
particular, ROA is inherently backward looking and is hence likely to lag stock returns in information 
content.  Moreover, incoming CEOs could take discretionary accounting decisions such as big-baths to 
manipulate future ROA.  We hope that a combined analysis of these two performance measures can shed 
some light on whether the excess compensation for talent agent clients represents rent extraction. 
5.1 Talent agents and future operating performance 
Table 7 presents results related to a regression of future ROA, i.e., 1 year, 3 year and 5 year ahead 
(ROAt+1, ROAt+3, ROAt+5) on the Talent Agent indicator variable after controlling for standard 
determinants of future performance.  In particular, we include a proxy for size (Log(Sales)), standard 
deviation of ROA (Std Dev of ROA), proxy for investment opportunities (Investment Opp) and current 
ROA (ROA).  The coefficient on the indicator variable captures the incremental association between the 
talent agent CEO and future performance.   
The results in panel A reveal a positive association between the talent agent indicator and future 
ROA for one and three years ahead.  Results from the propensity score matched sample reported in panel 
B paint a similar picture.   This suggests that firms that hire talent agent CEOs experience improved short 
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run future operating performance.  There is no evidence to suggest that the involvement of a talent agent 
is associated with lower operating performance. 
5.2 Talent agents and future stock performance 
Table 8 provides evidence on the association between talent agents and stock returns.  In 
particular, we consider monthly returns (less the risk free rate) for the 24 months preceding and following 
the CEO appointment date regressed on the four factor Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) model 
along with the talent agent indicator.  We also interact the factor loadings with the talent agent indicator 
to allow risk loadings to vary by group membership.  As before, panel A reports the regression results for 
the unmatched control sample whereas panel B reports results for the propensity score matched sample.   
Column (3) of Table 8 suggests that the involvement of talent agents is associated with positive 
abnormal returns for the months 0 to 12, regardless of whether the larger control group (panel A) or the 
propensity score matched sample is considered (panel B).18  However, the superior return performance is 
not seen after the 13th month in either panel.  Nevertheless, the positive abnormal returns from months 0 
to 12 are inconsistent with talent agents extracting rents at the expense of shareholder wealth.   
A closer look at the abnormal returns in months –24 to –13 prior to the new CEO hire suggests 
that firms in the talent agent group perform worse than the market (coefficient on Talent Agent is –1.49, t-
stat is –2.89).  However, this trailing under-performance weakens significantly when the propensity 
matched sample is considered (coefficient on talent agent is –1.14, t-stat is –1.56; see Panel B).  This 
pattern is consistent with allegations in Anders (2003) that talent agents like Bachelder often come on the 
scene at a point of vulnerability for a corporation, when its board is hoping for a cleanly executed 
leadership change to steady the firm and set a new course.  It is also consistent with Warner et al. (1988) 
and Huson et al (2001), who find that the probability of a change in CEO is inversely related to past stock 
returns.   
                                                 
18 Despite not explicitly matching on factor loadings, Panel B reports that, with the exception of the momentum 
factor, the factor loadings between treatment and matched control samples are not statistically different. This further 
validates that the matched control sample is similar to the treatment sample. 
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In sum, the collective weight of the evidence presented in Tables 7 and 8 are consistent with the 
hypothesis that skilled CEOs retain talent agents to signal their skill.  There is no evidence of rent 
extraction.   
5.3 Event study stock returns 
While we are unable to document any evidence of rent extraction after considering several 
alternative measures, it is useful to validate our findings by examining whether the capital market 
participants perceive the appointments of talent agent CEOs similarly.  That is, we investigate whether 
investors price such appointments any differently than other CEO appointments.  Therefore, in Table 9, 
we explore whether the short-window stock market reaction associated with the appointment of a talent 
agent CEO is significantly different from that of the unmatched control sample.  We define the event day 
0 as the date EXECUCOMP records as the day on which the executive became CEO (appointment date).  
If no trading occurs on the appointment date we define event day 0 as the next trading day.  If the talent 
agent CEO is perceived by the stock market as extracting value-destroying rents from the firm, then 
assuming market efficiency, the rent extraction hypothesis predicts that the short-window stock market 
reaction is negative.  In contrast, if the talent agent CEO is perceived as possessing superior talent and 
creating value, then assuming market efficiency, we predict that the short-window stock market reaction 
is positive. 
There are several caveats associated with the short-window event analysis.  First, the stock 
market might anticipate the need for a new CEO in both the control and treatment samples much before 
the new CEO is appointed.  Hence, our short-window event study tests might suffer from low statistical 
power.  Second, it is unclear whether the stock market is aware of the involvement of talent agent in the 
contract negotiation process at the time a talent agent CEO takes office.  Hence, attribution of the short 
window returns to rent extraction or efficient contracting will depend on the stock market’s ability to 
predict the involvement of talent agent.  However, these caveats are likely to bias against finding a 
differential reaction for the talent agent sample. 
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Table 9 presents several versions of short-window buy and hold stock returns for the talent agent 
and the two control groups (unmatched and the propensity score matched sample) where (i) event 
windows vary from (-5, +5) days to (-1, +1) days surrounding the appointment; and (ii) stock returns of 
the sample firms are benchmarked against returns to the CRSP value-weighted index and that of a size 
matched portfolio.19  Benchmarking returns surrounding the hiring date of the incoming CEO where a 
talent agent is involved to the returns around the hiring date of the control firm’s incoming CEO is 
important to rule out suggestions that the positive stock price reaction to a talent agent mediated CEO is 
attributable to the high opportunity cost of not having a CEO in place.  
The results presented in Table 9 suggest, in general, that the market views appointments of CEOs 
represented by talent agent as value-increasing relative to the control group.  For example, the difference 
between the market adjusted buy and hold return for the 11-day window surrounding the appointment of a 
talent agent CEO and the large control sample CEO is 5.58% (t-statistic = 2.67).  Similar results obtain 
when the event returns surrounding the appointment of talent agent CEOs are benchmarked against the 
appointment of CEOs in the propensity score matched control sample.  The event study results, subject to 
the caveats enumerated in the previous paragraph, again buttress our earlier findings hat skilled CEOs 
retain talent agents to signal their skill premium for talent.  These results do not support the rent 
extraction hypothesis.20   
 
                                                 
19 We also estimate average abnormal returns in addition to buy and hold abnormal returns and our inferences are 
unaffected.  
20 Combining results in Table 9 on event study returns and evidence of superior stock return performance in Table 5, 
the reader might ask how one could reconcile positive abnormal returns associated with this superior CEO 
subsequent to the CEO’s hiring date with the short-window positive returns around the CEO hiring date. We argue 
that even if the market knows that the incoming CEO hired a talent agent, the presence of such an agent represents 
an innovation, and the positive or negative performance consequences of this innovation become clear only with the 
passage of time. In this case, when there are improvements in subsequent operating performance, the market will be 
surprised and there will be positive abnormal returns for a period following the incoming CEO’s hiring date. For 
example, the stock market might react to changes in managerial investment and financing decisions, rather than to 
the presence of the talent agent associated with the incoming CEO. 
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6.0 Conclusions 
The paper provides empirical evidence on the nature of CEO employment contracts signed when 
third party intermediaries are involved in negotiations between the candidate CEO and the firm.  In 
particular, we find that when talent agents act on behalf of their client CEOs, the first year total 
compensation relative to a broad control sample is significantly higher by $10 million even after 
controlling for the standard set of economic determinants of pay, proxies for governance quality and 
proxies for the incoming CEO’s reservation wage.  In addition, the talent agent CEOs also tend to have 
greater equity-based incentives to increase their firm’s stock price relative to their control counterparts.   
While at first blush such “excess” compensation generated by talent agents on behalf of their 
CEO client may hint at rent extraction, our subsequent investigation suggests otherwise.  Specifically, we 
find a positive association between the involvement of talent agents and future operating and stock return 
performance of the hiring firm.  Consistent with the market revising its expectations upward, we also find 
that the short-window (one or five day) market reaction surrounding the appointment of a talent agent 
CEO is positive and significantly higher, on average, than that for the appointment of control sample 
CEOs.  Collectively the evidence suggests that the “excess” compensation paid to CEOs represented by 
talent agents is consistent with the hypothesis that skilled CEOs retain talent agents to signal their skill 
and is not consistent with rent extraction.   
Our study is subject to two caveats.  First, we have to caution the reader that demonstrating 
causality between the use of a talent agent and the CEO’s compensation contract is problematic for two 
reasons.  One, it is difficult for outside researchers to observe the negotiation process conducted by talent 
agent.  Two, as many of the talent agents tend to be lawyers, attorney-client confidentiality provisions 
force us to rely on a small, perhaps atypical sample of CEOs who are known to have used a talent agent.  
Nevertheless, we hope to inform the current debate about excess CEO pay by demonstrating that although 
the contractual and compensation terms negotiated by talent agents may appear to be opportunistic at the 
expense of the firm, we observe superior operating and stock performance subsequent to the involvement 
of a talent agent in the CEO appointment process.  Second, we acknowledge that the focus of the 
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manuscript is limited because the mechanisms by which CEOs are selected and compensated are much 
more complex.  In particular, our work suggests the need for more theoretical and empirical research on 
how third party intermediaries facilitate transactions in the CEO labor market.
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Table 1. Sample Formation 
 
Panel A. Treatment Sample Compilation 
 
In order to identify a CEO who retained one of the talent agents, we require any two of three items: year 
of agreement, firm name, or executive name.  Since firms are required to file employment agreements 
with the SEC and the agent is often mentioned as the executive’s representative, we search all SEC 
EDGAR filings for various permutations of the agent’s name. The results are then searched for 
employment agreements. In addition we search all employment contracts on file at The Corporate Library 
for various permutations the agent’s name. Lastly we search the LexisNexis Legal and Business News 
databases and Google for various permutations of the agent’s name.  The LexisNexis and Google search 
result in several popular press articles that give details of clients. Note that the identity of clients is 
covered under attorney-client confidentiality so compiling a client list from publicly available sources is 
necessary. 
 
Criteria Bachelder Stucker Cagney Total 
Identified firms with transactions involving the 
specified negotiator/lawyer 73 41 10 124 
Less: Unidentified Transactions: where firm is 
known but not the executive or the type of 
transaction 28 8 0 36 
Less: non-CEO employment agreements or where 
lawyer represented the firm 21 17 3 41 
Identified transactions involving CEO employment 
agreements  24 16 7 47 
Less: transactions prior to 1991 where 
compensation from EXECUCOMP and from firm 
filings is not available 1  1 2 
Less: Pre-IPO transactions 1 1  2 
Less: Private firm transactions: including those only 
trading on OTCBB pink sheets or acquired during 
the year the CEO was hired 5 1  6 
Less: Foreign firms 1   1 
Total clients in Treatment Sample 16 14 6 36 
     
Percent where firm’s name was referenced on the 
lawyer’s corporate webpage* 43.75% 53.85% 0.00% 41.18% 
     
Sources used for identification:     
Corporate Library 13    
SEC EDGAR filings 11    
LexisNexis press articles 12    
 
* The respective web pages only list firm names and by themselves do not provide enough information to 
identify the executive or the nature of the transaction 
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Panel B. Treatment Sample  
 
Executive Firm Executive Firm 
Lawrence Bossidy% Allied Signal/Honeywell Bob Nardelli Home Depot 
Robert Eaton Chrysler David Schneider Nextera 
George Fisher Eastman Kodak Jamie Dimon Bank One 
Louis Gerstner IBM Michael Hammes Sunrise Medical 
Michael Jordan Westinghouse/CBS W.G. Jurgensen Nationwide Insurance Company 
Floyd Hall K-Mart Douglas Conant Campbell Soup 
John Blystone SPX Corporation James McNerney 3M 
Stephen Bollenbach Hilton Hotels Jay Sugarman# Istar Financial/Starwood Capital 
Leo Mullin Delta Airlines John Edwardson CDW computer centers 
Michael Armstrong+ AT&T Lawrence Johnston  Albertsons 
Robert Morrison Quaker Oats Richard Lenny Hershey Foods 
Robert Iger Disney Steve Odland Autozone 
William Davis R.R. Donnelley David Cote Honeywell 
Gregory Andrew Carson Inc Patricia Russo Lucent 
Michael Hernandez LifeMark Ray Warrell# Genta 
Richard Nanula& Starwood Hotels Thomas Crocker# Koger Equity 
Samuel Reed Dean/Treehouse Foods Peter Georgiopoulus General Maritime 
Richard Brown EDS Surya Mohapatra Quest Diagnostics 
 
% Bossidy’s contract was negotiated in the latter part of 1991 but for the sake of data availability we use 
his 1992 EXECUCOMP record.  
+ Armstrong was a previous client of Bachelder, and while Bachelder represented the AT&T board in 
negotiations with Armstrong, he did hand select the negotiator/lawyer Sam Butler, who represented 
Armstrong.   
& While not flagged as a CEO by EXECUCOMP, Nanula was appointed CEO of Starwood Hotels 
Worldwide on 4/18/98 the publicly traded portion of the paired-share REIT Starwood Hotels and Resorts.  
Nanula resigned in 1999 when Starwood reorganized as a standard ‘C’ corporation and was not appointed 
CEO of the resulting firm. 
# Sugarman, Warrell, and Crocker were all identified as having used a negotiator to re-negotiate their 
employment terms. We were unable to find any evidence that a negotiator was used in the initial 
employment agreement. For these executives we treat the date of the renegotiated contract as the date the 
respective executive became CEO. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Treatment Sample 
Unmatched  
Control Sample 
Diff in 
Means KS 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median t-stat. p-value 
   
Firm Characteristics 
Sales 14178.78 6432.98 3879.72 1115.87 (6.86) [<0.001]
Market Value 15973.21 6101.19 5727.86 1050.92 (2.88) [<0.001]
Total Assets 23355.02 6476.18 4541.14 1173.07 (9.07) [<0.001]
ROA  0.28 2.85 0.48 3.74 (-0.06) [0.59] 
RET  12.57 0.02 11.48 3.67 (0.09) [0.42] 
Std Dev of ROA 5.00 3.28 6.32 2.96 (-0.43) [0.81] 
Std Dev of RET 47.19 33.39 51.10 35.99 (-0.64) [0.55] 
Investment Opp. 4.78 2.78 2.98 2.45 (0.87) [0.47] 
Altman-Z 3.88 3.19 4.26 2.99 (-0.23) [0.26] 
Institutional Holdings 0.54 0.58 0.60 0.62 (-1.58) [0.08] 
IsChair 0.67 1.00 0.33 0.00 (4.25) [0.001]
Interlocked 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 (-0.30) [0.99] 
Top5Directors  0.40 0.38 0.42 0.40 (-0.72) [0.05] 
Top5Interlocked 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 (-1.45) [0.84] 
Top5Ownership 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 (-0.86) [0.12] 
   
Reservation Wage Variables 
Outsider 0.81 1.00 0.30 0.00 (6.65) [<0.001]
CEO of Prior Employer 0.33 0.00 0.08 0.00 (5.52) [0.02] 
Industry Knowledge 0.28 0.00 0.12 0.00 (2.74) [0.38] 
Market Wage 4685.90 4162.18 4367.78 3624.02 (0.52) [0.10] 
   
Compensation Variables 
Total Compensation 17711.53 11301.56 4086.57 2064.96 (11.00) [<0.001]
Salary 799.37 667.65 522.76 478.78 (5.96) [0.002]
Equity 14341.32 7680.16 2816.13 953.20 (10.08) [<0.001]
Portfolio Delta 439.96 272.95 345.65 77.13 (0.12) [0.001]
 
Sales, Market Value, and Total Assets are Compustat data # 12, data #199 * data #25, and data #6 in 
millions.  ROA is net income before extraordinary items (Compustat data #18) scaled by Total Assets in 
percent.  RET is the fiscal year return buy-and-hold return from CRSP in percent.  Std Dev of ROA (Std 
Dev of RET) is the standard deviation of annual ROA (stock returns) in percent over the prior five fiscal 
years.  Investment Opp is the average fiscal year-end market-to-book ratio for the prior five years.  
Altman-Z is computed using Compustat data as follows: 1.2 * (data #179 / data #6) + 1.4* (data #36 / data 
#6) + 3.3 *(data #18 + data #16 + data #15)/data #6 + 0.6 * (data #199 * data #25)/ data #181 +data #12 / 
data #6.  Institutional Holdings is the fraction of shares held by institutions (13-F filers) as of fiscal year 
end.  IsChair is equal to 1 if the CEO is also chair of the Board, and 0 otherwise.  Interlocked is equal to 1 
if the CEO is interlocked with a member of his/her compensation committee, and 0 otherwise.  
Top5Directors is the fraction of the top five highest paid executives serving on the Board.   
Top5Interlocked is the fraction of the top five highest paid executives interlocked with a member the 
compensation committee.  Top5Ownership is the fraction of share outstanding held by the top five highest 
paid executives, excluding options.  Outsider equals 1 if the CEO’s previous position was with a different 
firm, 0 otherwise.  CEO of Prior Employer equals 1 if the CEO was also the CEO in his previous 
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position, 0 otherwise.  Industry Knowledge equals 1 if the CEO’s previous position was with a different 
firm in the same Fama and French (1997) industry classification as the sample firm, and 0 otherwise.  
Market Wage is the mean compensation for CEOs joining a firm in the same year and Fama and French 
(1997) industry code in thousands.  Total Compensation is the sum of salary (Salary), bonus, other 
annual, restricted stock granted (Restricted Stock), the risk-neutral value of options granted (Options), 
long term incentive payouts, and all other total, in thousands.  Equity is the sum of Restricted Stock and 
Options. Portfolio Delta is the change in the risk-neutral dollar value of the CEO’s equity portfolio for a 
1% change in the firm’s stock price (Core and Guay, 2000) in thousands.  t-statistics (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov p-values) are shown in parentheses (brackets) and test for a difference in means (distributions) 
between CEOs who used a talent agent and those that did not.  The sample is composed of all new CEOs 
known to have used a talent agent and 1,761 other new CEOs (excluding co-CEOs) on Execucomp with 
non-missing start dates, compensation data, the requisite data on CRSP and Compustat to compute the 
above variables. 
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Table 3. Propensity Score Matching 
 
Panel A. Propensity Score Estimation 
 
Pr(Talent Agent= 1) = F( α Economic Determinants + β Governance Determinants + γ Reservation 
Wage Determinants + ε ) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 coef z-stat coef z-stat coef z-stat 
Intercept -3.42*** (-6.32) -3.03*** (-5.48) -3.71*** (-5.76) 
      
Economic Determinants      
Log(Sales) 0.18*** (2.77) 0.19*** (2.86) 0.19*** (2.58) 
ROA  -0.01 (-1.13) -0.01 (-0.79) 0.00 (-0.56) 
RET  0.001 (0.59) 0.001 (1.02) 0.002** (1.98) 
Std Dev of ROA -0.01 (-0.75) -0.01 (-0.62) -0.01 (-0.59) 
Std Dev of RET 0.0003 (0.34) 0.001 (0.81) -0.0001 (-0.06) 
Investment Opp. 0.01 (1.54) 0.01* (1.64) 0.01 (1.17) 
Altman-Z 0.00 (0.42) 0.00 (0.78) 0.00 (0.94) 
      
Governance Determinants      
Institutional Holdings   -1.00*** (-2.80) -1.08*** (-2.70) 
IsChair   0.54*** (3.35) 0.44** (2.46) 
Interlocked   0.25 (0.46) 0.23 (0.43) 
Top5Directors    -0.42 (-1.07) 0.07 (0.19) 
Top5Interlocked   -3.81*** (-3.18) -3.57*** (-3.21) 
Top5Ownership   0.40 (0.60) 0.44 (0.68) 
      
Reservation Wage Determinants      
Outsider     0.88*** (3.49) 
CEO of Prior Employer     0.39* (1.74) 
Industry Knowledge     -0.11 (-0.57) 
Market Wage     0.00002* (1.74) 
    
χ2 /  Pseudo R2 12.62 / 5.85 51.19 / 12.70 104.82 / 23.12 
Akaike Info. Criterion 348.183 336.028 307.239 
N 1,797  1,797 1,797 
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Panel B. Covariate Balance for Propensity Score Matched Sample 
 
 
Treatment 
N=36 
Control 
N=36 
Diff in 
Means KS 
 Mean Median Mean Median t-stat. p-value 
Log(Sales) 8.29 8.77 8.54 8.68 (-0.48) [0.50] 
ROA  0.28 2.85 1.14 2.64 (-0.23) [0.70] 
RET  12.57 0.02 36.47 2.60 (-0.87) [0.50] 
Std Dev of ROA 5.00 3.28 3.67 2.47 (0.99) [0.70] 
Std Dev of RET 47.19 33.39 57.25 37.82 (-0.85) [0.70] 
Investment Opp. 4.78 2.78 8.34 2.16 (-0.95) [0.50] 
Altman-Z 3.88 3.19 4.42 2.01 (-0.96) [0.02] 
Institutional Holdings 0.54 0.58 0.48 0.46 (1.48) [0.34] 
IsChair 0.67 1.00 0.83 1.00 (-2.29) [0.70] 
Interlocked 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.00 (-0.55) [0.99] 
Top5Directors  0.40 0.38 0.33 0.40 (1.55) [0.70] 
Top5Interlocked 0.003 0.00 0.00 0.00 (2.91) [0.50] 
Top5Ownership 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 (-0.14) [0.07] 
Outsider 0.81 1.00 1.00 1.00 (-2.80) [0.50] 
CEO of Prior Employer 0.33 0.00 0.72 1.00 (-3.17) [0.01] 
Industry Knowledge 0.28 0.00 0.33 0.00 (-0.63) [0.99] 
Market Wage 4685.90 4162.18 4583.97 3891.67 (0.13) [0.50] 
 
Panel A estimates the probability that a new CEO used a talent agent. Talent Agent is an indicator equal 
one if the CEO used a talent agent and zero otherwise, F(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function.  All other variables are as previously defined.  Huber-White robust z-statistics are shown in 
parentheses.  ***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.   
 
Panel B reports means and medians for the Propensity Score Matched Sample. The Propensity Score 
Sample is a one-to-one match sample between the treatment sample, those new CEOs who used a talent 
agent, and the control sample, those new CEOs who are most likely to use a talent agent, where the 
probability of using an agent is estimated according to Model 3 in Panel A.  t-statistics based on standard 
errors clustered by firm and year are shown in parentheses and test for a difference in means between 
treatment and control samples.  Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) p-values are shown in square brackets and 
test for a difference in distributions between treatment and control samples. 
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Table 4.  First Year Compensation Regressions 
 
Panel A. Unmatched Sample 
 
 
Total Comp. 
(1) 
Total Comp. 
(2) 
Total Comp. 
(3) 
Total Comp. 
(4) 
Salary 
(5) 
Equity  
(6) 
Intercept -10386.40
*** 1366.87*** -524.69 -12290.70*** -436.70*** -9652.48*** 
(-4.92) (2.56) (-0.82) (-5.39) (-11.66) (-4.35) 
Talent Agent 11626.48
*** 13663.67*** 12392.90*** 10320.04*** 141.58** 8880.64*** 
(5.53) (7.57) (6.82) (5.01) (2.35) (4.25) 
Economic Determinants 
Log(Sales) 1752.24
***   1563.06*** 111.95*** 1096.04*** 
(7.18)   (7.42) (21.74) (5.66) 
ROA  -16.93   -6.79 -0.74
** -1.62 
(-1.15)   (-1.21) (-2.44) (-0.58) 
RET  1.59   -0.99 0.05 -1.90 (0.31)   (-0.22) (0.64) (-0.45) 
Std Dev of ROA 79.55
***   36.73* 1.27*** 33.51 
(2.89)   (1.68) (2.73) (1.63) 
Std Dev of RET 7.92   -0.98 -0.10 -0.20 (1.45)   (-0.22) (-1.22) (-0.05) 
Investment Opp. 29.44   18.71 0.62
* 18.76 
(1.11)   (1.04) (1.87) (1.02) 
Altman-Z 263.21
**   201.40*** 0.89 197.23*** 
(2.17)   (2.72) (1.02) (2.72) 
Governance Determinants      
Institutional Holdings  4449.86
***  79.50 128.33*** -539.10 
 (7.32)  (0.17) (5.60) (-0.95) 
IsChair  732.50
**  67.76 31.12** -49.46 
 (2.25)  (0.19) (2.53) (-0.15) 
Interlocked  -2648.29  -1025.86 -43.06
*** -815.78 
 (-3.41)  (-1.45) (-3.04) (-1.41) 
Top5Directors   -207.42  -700.63 97.03
*** -609.19 
 (-0.14)  (-0.89) (2.78) (-0.83) 
Top5Interlocked  3366.01
**  3055.48** -3.17 2374.66** 
 (1.96)  (2.17) (-0.09) (1.96) 
Top5Ownership  -2782.92
*  -342.36 37.17 -579.57 
 (-1.83)  (-0.27) (0.61) (-0.48) 
Reservation Wage Determinants 
Outsider   1863.45
*** 2436.44*** -12.47 2121.97*** 
  (3.92) (4.96) (-0.82) (5.33) 
CEO of Prior Employer   20.61 -42.75 18.97 88.78   (0.04) (-0.11) (0.86) (0.21) 
Industry Knowledge   -126.36 -195.69 -14.81 18.71   (-0.15) (-0.30) (-0.73) (0.03) 
Market Wage   0.93
*** 0.87*** 0.01*** 0.83*** 
  (6.36) (6.25) (3.50) (5.67) 
       
Adjusted R2 20.17 8.64 27.44 38.02 50.53 34.55 
N 1797 1797 1797 1797 1797 1797 
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Panel B. Propensity Score Matched Sample 
 
 Total Comp. Salary Equity  
 Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control 
Mean 17711.53*** 8358.19 799.37 662.22 14341.32*** 6428.78 
Median 11301.56*** 3262.72 667.65 642.50 7680.16*** 2135.46 
    
t-statistic 3.12 1.19 2.91 
z-statistic 3.08 0.79 2.90 
KS p-value 0.008 0.87 0.008 
 
Panel A presents regression results from estimating first year pay as a function of economic, governance, and reservation 
wage determinants.  In each regression we exclude those observations with a Cook-D greater than 1.  Talent Agent is a 
variable equal 1 if the CEO used a talent agent, and 0 otherwise.  All other variables are as previously defined.  t-statistics 
based on standard errors clustered by firm and year are shown in parentheses.  ***/**/* indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%/5%/10% level.   
 
Panel B tests for differences in means, medians, and distribution of executive compensation between treatment 
and control firms for the Propensity Score Matched Sample.  t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm 
and year are shown in parentheses and test for a difference in means between treatment and control samples.  
Wilcoxon z-statistics are shown in angle brackets and test for difference in ranks between the samples, and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) p-values are shown in square brackets and test for a difference in distributions 
between treatment and control samples.  ***/**/* indicate a statistically significant difference at the 1%/5%/10% 
level.   
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Table 5.  Compensation Regressions For Years Subsequent to Appointment 
 
Panel A. Unmatched Sample 
 
 
Total Comp. 
(1) 
Total Comp. 
(2) 
Total Comp. 
(3) 
Total Comp. 
(4) 
Salary 
(5) 
Equity  
(6) 
Intercept -13590.80
*** 913.49 3188.66*** -14216.80*** -647.04*** -9953.37*** 
(-9.83) (1.58) (7.58) (-10.38) (-9.49) (-8.47) 
Talent Agent 3853.75
*** 6764.94*** 6276.66*** 2745.79** 180.87** 1759.60* 
(2.70) (3.79) (3.64) (2.08) (2.03) (1.73) 
Economic Determinants 
Log(Sales) 2201.51
***   2136.48*** 154.19*** 1416.72*** 
(11.46)   (10.66) (15.04) (8.20) 
ROA  -12.91   -15.12 -0.97 -13.21 (-1.03)   (-1.31) (-1.41) (-1.45) 
RET  6.30   5.93 -0.02 4.18 (1.61)   (1.58) (-0.28) (1.21) 
Std Dev of ROA 55.96
***   46.84*** 1.78*** 35.00*** 
(3.32)   (3.09) (2.69) (2.86) 
Std Dev of RET 12.42
***   8.47** 0.07 9.07*** 
(2.86)   (2.18) (0.50) (2.69) 
Investment Opp. 2.41   2.19 0.13 1.12 (0.70)   (0.69) (1.00) (0.52) 
Altman-Z 198.18
***   201.31 2.39* 187.47*** 
(5.91)   (6.17) (1.88) (6.10) 
Governance Determinants      
Institutional Holdings  3244.50
***  453.48 149.16*** 100.44 
 (4.51)  (0.77) (4.61) (0.19) 
IsChair  1865.40
***  487.30** 70.49*** 171.15 
 (5.62)  (1.82) (6.20) (0.81) 
Interlocked  -1044.20  -786.88 -40.31
* -1089.54** 
 (-1.58)  (-1.49) (-1.94) (-2.08) 
Top5Directors   1080.48  -1123.55 17.46 -920.33  (1.11)  (-1.38) (0.36) (-1.18) 
Top5Interlocked  1842.98  3692.41 -179.91
** 3575.85 
 (0.67)  (1.58) (-2.53) (1.50) 
Top5Ownership  -6161.44
***  -1489.73 -61.09 -1100.32 
 (-3.40)  (-0.95) (-0.79) (-0.84) 
Reservation Wage Determinants 
Outsider   125.94 814.45
*** 49.62*** 684.11*** 
  (0.35) (2.58) (2.98) (3.02) 
CEO of Prior 
Employer 
  1553.71** 1579.58** -3.27 1011.37*** 
  (1.65) (2.16) (-0.09) (1.97) 
Industry Knowledge   -420.61 -699.56 -21.79 -509.50   (-0.74) (-1.41) (-0.91) (-1.29) 
Market Wage   0.25
*** 0.20*** 0.01* 0.14*** 
  (3.31) (3.62) (1.92) (3.82) 
       
Adjusted R2 20.56 5.18 4.29 22.66 50.53 13.78 
N 5333 5333 5333 5333 5333 5333 
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Panel B. Propensity Score Matched Sample 
 
 Total Comp. Salary Equity  
 Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control 
Mean 11450.51 18975.12 1134.97 981.04 7202.82 14346.86 
Median 7679.48 5611.62 1000.00*** 792.96 3810.18 2913.31 
    
t-statistic -0.88 0.63 -0.94 
z-statistic 1.23 3.34 0.32 
KS p-value 0.03 0.004 0.22 
 
Panel A presents regression results from estimating pay (for all subsequent years subsequent to CEO appointment) as a 
function of economic, governance, and reservation wage determinants.  In each regression we exclude those observations 
with a Cook-D greater than 1.  Talent Agent is a variable equal 1 if the CEO used a talent agent, and 0 otherwise.  All 
other variables are as previously defined.  t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm and year are shown in 
parentheses.    ***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.   
 
Panel B tests for differences in means, medians, and distribution of executive compensation between treatment and 
control firms for the Propensity Score Matched Sample.  t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm and year 
are shown in parentheses and test for a difference in means between treatment and control samples.  Wilcoxon z-statistics 
are shown in angle brackets and test for difference in ranks between the samples, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) p-values 
are shown in square brackets and test for a difference in distributions between treatment and control samples.  ***/**/* 
indicate a statistically significant difference at the 1%/5%/10% level.   
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Table 6.  Equity Incentives 
 
Panel A. Unmatched Sample 
 
Dependent Variable: Portfolio Delta 
 First Year  Subsequent Years 
 Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat 
Intercept -2.03*** (-16.67) -2.64*** (-12.95) 
Talent Agent 0.72*** (4.77) 0.72*** (4.99) 
Log(Sales) 0.33*** (17.82) 0.44*** (19.63) 
Std Dev of ROA 0.01*** (5.06) 0.01*** (2.95) 
Std Dev of RET 0.001 (0.96) 0.003** (2.28) 
Investment Opp. 0.01 (1.50) 0.00 (0.95) 
Altman-Z 0.02*** (2.85) 0.04** (2.22) 
Institutional Holdings 1.05*** (8.24) 1.53*** (10.10) 
IsChair 0.13* (1.75) 0.22*** (3.69) 
Interlocked 0.13 (1.01) 0.08 (0.72) 
Top5Directors 0.48*** (4.30) 0.11 (0.61) 
Top5Interlocked 0.19 (0.50) 0.30 (0.58) 
     
Adjusted R2 24.92 35.86 
N 1797  5333 
 
Panel B. Propensity Score Matched Sample 
 
 Incentives, First-Year  Incentives, Subsequent Years  
 Treatment Control Treatment Control 
Mean 2.53* 2.00 3.48* 2.88 
Median 3.00 2.00 4.00*** 3.00 
   
t-statistic 1.64 1.75 
z-statistic 1.58 3.06 
KS p-value 0.34 0.006 
 
Panel A presents regression results from estimating equity incentives of first year CEOs and non-first year 
CEOs as a function of economic and governance determinants.  Talent Agent is a variable equal 1 if the 
CEO used a talent, and 0 otherwise.  Our measure of equity incentives is the quintile rank of the change in 
the risk-neutral value of the CEO’s equity portfolio for a 1% change in the price of the underlying stock, 
Portfolio Delta.  We use the quintile rank of Portfolio Delta in our analysis to reduce measurement 
associated with computing the equity portfolio delta (Core and Guay, 2002).  t-statistics based on standard 
errors clustered by firm and year are shown in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 
1%/5%/10% level.   
 
Panel B tests for differences in means, medians, and distribution of equity incentives between treatment 
and control firms for the Propensity Score Matched Sample.  t-statistics based on standard errors clustered 
by firm and year are shown in parentheses and test for a difference in means between treatment and 
control samples.  Wilcoxon z-statistics are shown in angle brackets and test for difference in ranks 
between the samples, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) p-values are shown in square brackets and test for a 
difference in distributions between treatment and control samples.  ***/**/* indicate a statistically 
significant difference at the 1%/5%/10% level.   
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Table 7. Future Operating Performance Regressions 
 
Panel A. Unmatched Sample 
 
ROAt+T = α0 + α1 Talent Agent + α2 Log(Sales) + α3 InvestmentOpp + α4 ROA + α5 Std Dev of ROA + ε  
 
Dependent Var.: ROA t+1 ROA t+3 ROA t+5 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Talent Agent 1.79** (2.35) 1.55** (2.02) -0.40 (-0.24) 
Log(Sales) 0.19 (1.11) 0.63*** (4.16) 0.73*** (4.00) 
Std Dev of ROA -0.06** (-2.46) -0.06** (-2.51) -0.05 (-1.60) 
Investment Opp. -0.00 (-0.09) 0.01 (1.05) 0.02 (1.29) 
ROA 0.45*** (11.25) 0.34*** (6.80) 0.36*** (6.53) 
    
Adjusted R2 38.07 32.00 30.37 
N 1666 1666 1666 
  
Panel B. Propensity Score Matched Sample 
 
 ROA t+1 ROA t+3 ROA t+5 
 Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control 
Mean 4.48* -1.51 4.64** -1.11 4.01 1.48 
Median 5.61** 1.92 4.78** 1.68 4.78* 2.34 
    
t-statistic 1.91 2.07 0.65 
z-statistic 2.51 2.49 2.00 
KS p-value 0.03 0.05 0.05 
 
Panel A presents regressions of future operating performance on an indicator variable for whether the 
CEO used a talent agent (Talent Agent). ROA t+T  is the average ROA in percent over the future T years. 
All other variables are as previously defined.  t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm and 
year are shown in parentheses.  ***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.   
 
Panel B tests for differences in means, medians, and distribution of future operating performance between 
treatment and control firms for the Propensity Score Matched Sample.  t-statistics based on standard 
errors clustered by firm and year are shown in parentheses and test for a difference in means between 
treatment and control samples.  Wilcoxon z-statistics are shown in angle brackets and test for difference 
in ranks between the samples, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) p-values are shown in square brackets and 
test for a difference in distributions between treatment and control samples.  ***/**/* indicate a 
statistically significant difference at the 1%/5%/10% level.   
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Table 8. Abnormal Stock Return Regressions 
 
(ri – rf)  = α1 + α2 Talent Agent + β1 MKTRF+ β2 SMB + β3 HML + β4 MOM +  
       β5 Talent Agent*MKTRF+ β6 Talent Agent*SMB + β7 Talent Agent*HML + β8 Talent Agent*MOM + v 
 
Panel A. Unmatched Sample 
 
Event Window: t=-24…-13 t=-12…-1 t=0…12 t=13…24 
Variable Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 0.19 (1.45) -0.60*** (-3.78) 0.32** (2.39) 0.05 (0.32) 
Talent Agent -1.49*** (-2.89) 0.71 (0.98) 1.78** (2.53) 0.30 (0.50) 
MKTRF 1.09*** (31.82) 1.15*** (27.99) 1.13*** (27.47) 1.08*** (30.03) 
SMB 0.58*** (11.02) 0.56*** (10.83) 0.61*** (13.36) 0.57*** (14.15) 
HML 0.31*** (5.42) 0.47*** (8.83) 0.51*** (8.29) 0.51*** (9.77) 
MOM -0.23*** (-7.51) -0.23*** (-4.90) -0.33*** (-8.60) -0.23*** (-6.77) 
Talent Agent*MKTRF 0.02 (0.15) -0.04 (-0.24) -0.29 (-1.53) -0.18 (-1.12) 
Talent Agent*SMB -0.29** (-2.32) -0.56*** (-3.18) -0.68*** (-3.36) -0.34** (-1.96) 
Talent Agent*HML -0.44 (-0.23) -0.40 (-0.18) -0.49** (-2.45) -0.42 (-0.17) 
Talent Agent*MOM -0.12 (-0.88) 0.04 (0.32) -0.36 (-2.63) 0.27** (2.14) 
     
Adjusted R2 13.43 12.83 12.82 12.06 
N 21318 21509 23328 20503 
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Panel B. Propensity Score Matched Sample 
  
Event Window:         t = -24…-13         t = -12…-1         t = 0…12         t = 13…24 
Variable Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept -0.16 (-0.32) -0.86 (-1.29) -0.10 (-0.11) 1.31 (1.56) 
Talent Agent -1.14 (-1.56) 0.96 (0.99) 2.21** (2.17) -0.97 (-1.01) 
MKTRF 1.33*** (9.69) 1.27*** (8.24) 1.13*** (4.61) 0.65*** (2.86) 
SMB -0.03 (-0.17) 0.23 (1.01) 0.45* (1.82) 0.64*** (2.71) 
HML 0.35** (2.00) 0.43* (1.72) 0.43 (1.34) 0.48* (1.78) 
MOM -0.27** (-2.20) -0.03 (-0.26) -0.31 (-1.23) -0.56*** (-2.73) 
Talent Agent*MKTRF -0.23 (-1.21) -0.16 (-0.76) -0.29 (-0.89) 0.24 (0.91) 
Talent Agent*SMB 0.32 (1.42) -0.22 (-0.81) -0.52 (-1.52) -0.41 (-1.49) 
Talent Agent*HML -0.85 (-0.33) 0.46 (0.01) -0.41 (-1.09) -0.19 (-0.05) 
Talent Agent*MOM -0.09 (-0.49) -0.16 (-0.95) -0.38** (-2.15) 0.60*** (2.69) 
     
Adjusted R2 18.54 15.41 11.32 10.59 
N 840 852 928 816 
 
Panels A and B present results from estimating average monthly abnormal returns (alpha). Regressions are estimated over four non-overlapping 
windows spanning the twenty four months prior to and the twenty four months subsequent to the month the CEO was hired (t = 0). ri is the monthly firm return, rf  is the monthly risk-free interest rate, MKTRF, SMB, HML, and MOM are the monthly Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) factors, and Talent Agent is a variable equal 1 if the CEO used a talent agent, and 0 otherwise.  t-statistics are shown in parentheses and are 
based on standard errors clustered by date.  Average abnormal returns are the intercept (alpha) from the respective regression, and the difference in 
average abnormal returns between firms that hired a CEO who used an agent and those that hired CEOs who did not use an agent is the coefficient 
on Talent Agent.  ***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.   
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Table 9. CEO Appointment Date Abnormal Returns 
 
Panel A. Unmatched Sample. 
 
Measure: Mkt. Adjusted Mkt. Adjusted Mkt. Adjusted Size Adjusted Size Adjusted Size Adjusted 
Interval: BHAR(-5,+5) BHAR(-5,0) BHAR(1,+5) BHAR(-5,+5) BHAR(-5,0) BHAR(1,+5) 
Intercept 0.47 0.17 0.34 0.34 0.04 0.34 (1.55) (0.85) (1.53) (1.16) (0.21) (1.56) 
Talent Agent 5.58
*** 3.80*** 1.56 5.60*** 3.87*** 1.52 
(2.67) (3.15) (1.07) (2.65) (3.23) (1.03) 
       
N 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 
 
Panel B. Propensity Score Matched Sample 
 
Measure: Mkt. Adjusted Mkt. Adjusted Mkt. Adjusted Size Adjusted Size Adjusted Size Adjusted 
Interval: BHAR(-5,+5) BHAR(-5,0) BHAR(1,+5) BHAR(-5,+5) BHAR(-5,0) BHAR(1,+5) 
Intercept 0.60 2.92
* -2.32* 0.62 2.95* -2.32* 
(0.24) (1.67) (-1.70) (0.25) (1.67) (-1.70) 
Talent Agent 5.45
* 1.05 4.22** 5.32 0.96 4.17** 
(1.66) (0.50) (2.08) (1.62) (0.46) (2.05) 
       
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 
 
Panels A and B present results from regressions of buy-and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) on an indicator variable for whether the CEO used a 
talent agent (Talent Agent).  Market (size) adjusted BHAR are calculated as the compounded return of the firm over the daily event interval 
specified, minus that of the CRSP value-weighted index (firm i’s size decile).  Event day 0 is defined as the date Execucomp records as the day the 
executive became CEO (appointment date).  If no trading occurs on the appointment date we define event day 0 as the next trading day.  t-statistics 
based on standard errors clustered by firm and year are shown in parentheses.  ***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
 
